have not proven successful. On December 31, 2004, the LRA dismissed the proposed mutual ceasefire, accusing the government of pushing a one-sided agreement. As of February 22, 2005, the government implemented a unilateral ceasefire in the Gulu and Kitgum districts where peace talks are taking place. This was to prove its commitment to a negotiated peace settlement. However, while the peace talks continued, fighting became more concentrated in other areas it is unclear if the government will renew the unilateral ceasefire at this point.

The Ugandan government had made headway in the negotiating process through dialogues with LRA Colonel Kamudulu and Brigadier Kolo. On February 4 and 16 respectively, these men handed themselves over to the government. KoloÕs surrender was a reaction to the news that Kony ordered his execution upon return to Sudan. The defection of these two officials was seen as a huge success on the part of the Ugandan government. However, KoloÕs capitulation demonstrates both the fear that Kony holds over his men, as well his dire opposition to negotiate with the government.

On the other end of the spectrum is President Museveni, who himself refuses to sit down and negotiate with Kony. The Oxford Analytica states that Museveni believes a meeting would Òbestow on him [Kony], the legitimacy of being a fellow African leader and Ôfreedom fighterÕ. Additionally, to Museveni, a negotiated peace reflects negatively on his ability to lead the country and insists that a military victory would be more honorable. A successfully negotiated peace would also mean that the military would no longer be ale to resist the pressures from aid organizations asking them to scale down military spending. The government has always been able to justify increased spending because of the civil war.

A diplomat in Kampala, Uganda states that the cause of the breakdown of the peace talks is attributed to the absence of core leaders from both sides and describes it as a meeting of juniors. With both sides holding strong feelings against a negotiated peace, it appears that negotiations by non-extremists are irrelevant. Instead, such negotiations create a more radical LRA, while the moderates who partake in the negotiations defect to the governmentÕs side.

What About Sudan?
Since 1994, the politics of the Ugandan civil war has become entrenched in the Sudanese war, with the Sudanese government aiding the LRA, and the Ugandan government retaliating by allying itself with the Sudanese PeopleÕs Liberation Army (SPLA). The Sudanese government has supplied the LRA with 80% of their weapons and has allowed them the strategic staging grounds of southern Sudan.

This relationship has been incredibly beneficial to the LRA, which acquired both support from Sudan and a place to retreat to. It has additionally helped the LRA because many Ugandan Army resources have been consumed by the support for the SPLA in Sudan.

Recent headlines regarding Uganda have focused on the success of SudanÕs peace and the possible positive implications for the civil war in Uganda. The major success is the part of the peace which declared an end to Sudanese government support of the LRA. While this peace outlines the expulsion of the LRA from Sudan in order to focus on rehabilitating the region, the LRA is still present in the area. All support for the LRA from the Sudanese government must end according to the treaty, including the cut-off of weapons supplies to the LRA. This will not create a problem for the LRA because at the risk of a possible cut-off, Kony created large arms stashes that could last for years, according to the Oxford Analytica.

Along with the peace, comes a commitment from the Sudanese PeopleÕs Liberation Army (SPLA) to work with the Ugandan PeopleÕs Defense Forces (UPDF) to fight the LRA. With this new peace, the military has been re-allocated to a more strategic position against the LRA. As of yet, there is merely a reduction of support from the Sudanese government and not a complete shut-off. Additionally, the issues surrounding possible negative impacts of the peace need to be addressed.

On the surface, it appears that the LRA is right where the UPDF wants them, pushed up against a wall. There is the possibility that this loss of support combined with the added threat from the SPLA, is only throwing fuel on an already out-of-control fire. Perhaps, the LRA will only become more radical and definitively step away from the peace table.

There is no doubt that the Sudanese peace has been successful at strengthening the position of the Ugandan government, however, it may have also weakened the possibility of a Ugandan-negotiated peace. With the two sides diametrically opposed to the other, an already stated preference of a military resolution to the war, strengthened UPDF presence, and increased pressure on the LRA, it is quite possible that the situation will explode into a much more devastating war.